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Chapter 2 
Globalization and the Developmental 
State: Reflections on the Asian 
Financial Crisis 
Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang 
Introduction 
Mohamad Mahathir remarked, "All these countries have spent forty years 
to build up their economies and a moron like [George] Soros comes along" 
(Loh, 1997). Increasingly, political leaders in the developing nations 
witness the powerful market forces which render national fiscal, monetary, 
and regulatory policies weakened, if not totally ineffective. With increased 
economic globalization, national governments throughout the world see 
their power increasingly compromised and dependent on non-domestic 
factors, including global regimes of trade and finance. In essense, 
globalization became the paradigm (or cliche) of the post-Cold War era. 
Although its advent and presence seem irrefutable, its impact on domestic 
and international politics needs more studying. 
A particularly important issue- the impact of globalization on 
governance in nation-states and the authority and legitimacy of the state-
requires careful exploration. Will it cause the demise of the state, 'the 
withering away of the state', as Karl Marx put it? Or can globalization lead 
to the intensification of state powers? 
Related to the issue of governance, globalization also affects economic 
performance. Globalization can propel countries to new economic heights 
or it can lead to dramatic domestic dislocations- a fact affirmed by the 
changing fortunes of East Asia. The rapid economic ascent in recent 
decades of such Asian countries as South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 
has often been attributed to their developmental state (Woo-Cumings, 1999; 
Johnson, 1982), whose astute stewardship of export-led industrialization 
coincided with the expansion of world trade. However, the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997-9 (Pempel, 1999) raised fundamental questions about the 
continued viability of developmental state and the perils of outward-
looking development strategies in an increasingly globalized world 
economy. 
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This chapter discusses the challenges that globalization poses to the 
developmental state. It argues that the crisis induced by participation in the 
global economy has made it imperative to reform, but not jettison, the state. 
It will begin with an argument for placing the present globalization in a 
longer historical context. Then, it will contrast two different theories on the 
East Asian economic miracle that are relevant to the discussions on 
globalization. It will then show the degree of Asia's globalization in light 
of certain commonly used indicators so as to establish a partial account of 
the Asian financial crisis. It will conclude with a discussion of the future of 
the developmental state. 
Globalization: New or Old? 
The Cold War ended with the apparent dominance of liberal democracy 
over other forms of governance over Communist command economy based 
systems of Eastern Europe and Russia. As part of the resulting political 
analysis, Francis Fukuyama (1989) wrote of the dominance of liberal 
democratic systems into the future and prompted lively debate about the 
contours of the New World Order. Those who embrace and champion 
globalization emphasize the benign and potentially boundless promises that 
the current round of intensified globalization entails. In particular, 
advocates of globalization note that computerization and the digitization of 
communications lead to the 'the death of distance' (Cairncross, 1998). 
Increased international interactions created more porous borders and 
thereby transformed the state-centered Westphalian international system 
into a 'global village' (Falk, 1998). 
Thomas L. Friedman, columnist for The New York Times and author of 
The Lexus and the Olive Tree, argues that globalization contributed to the 
emergence of a global marketplace and the rise of a 'homogeneous' global 
culture that reflects "the spread of Americanization on a global scale" 
(1999, 8). 'Globalphiles' like Friedman argue that free-market capitalism 
drives globalization, particularly since its apparent triumph over other 
ideological alternatives, as vindicated by the end of the Cold War 
(Fukuyama, 1989). Friedman asserts, 'The globalization system has 
replaced the Cold War system ... The world is 10 years old" (1999, xiii and 
7). Others take a broader view on globalization, banking on its 
emancipating consequences. For example, the 1999 Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 1999b) pins its hope that "global markets, global 
technology, global ideas, and global solidarity" can still "enrich the lives of 
people everywhere." 
Many critics of globalization provide sober assessments about the 
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social and economic costs of the entire process in order to help shape a 
more sustainable future path for globalization. Some fear that globalization 
may heighten communal and cultural conflicts (Barber, 1995). Others 
criticize that globalization exacerbates the gap between the 'haves' and the 
'have-nots'- both between and within countries. Still others worry that the 
trade-off for interdependence is 'sovereignty at bay' with governments 
experiencing increasingly that external forces will undermine their ability 
to control their economies and to protect their citizens. 
Still others question whether globalization represents a new 
phenomenon. In a thoughtful piece that places globalization in a broader 
historical context, Emma Rothschild (1999, 107) laments "globalization has 
been depicted, for much of the last 20 years, as a condition of the present 
and the future- a phenomenon without a past." Indeed, if one accepts a 
commonly used definition of globalization- "the intensification of 
economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders" (Holm and 
Sarensen, 1995), then globalization not only occurred in history, but 
empirical evidence suggests its greater presence and integration before 
World War I. 
Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson (1999) take a long-term 
historical perspective. They point out perceptively that the current era 
represents the fourth epoch in the world history of capitalism. Adapted 
from their analysis of capitalism, Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics 
of each stage of globalization. 
Table 2.1 shows that despite their similarities, each of these four epochs 
has its own driving forces, zeitgeist, and distinctive political events. The 
fourth and present epoch- since the 1970s- is characterized by the 
revolutionary impact of technology, particularly information technology 
(IT), which helps free market capitalism to expand globally with 
unprecedented speed and elan. The end of the Cold War and the apparent 
failure of other ideological alternatives are the most symbolic events. 
As to the indicators for measuring globalization, Ankie Hoogvelt 
(1997, 69) points out that three key economic figures are conventionally 
marshaled to attest to the increasing internationalization of the world 
economy: 
• world trade volume (in particular the allegedly rising ratio of world trade to output); 
• the growth and spread of foreign direct investment through multinational corporations 
(also expressed in relation to world output and trade); and 
• the expansion of all international capital flows (and their patterns of integration). 
Globalization and the Developmental State 13 
Table 2.1 Globalization- deja vu? 
Epochs First Second Third Fourth 
Duration 1492-1789 1789-1900 1900-1970s l 970s-present 
Age of Discovery and Revolution, The 'Age of The 
Discovery and conquest capital, and Extremes' 'information 
Enlightenment empire (Hobsbami) age' 
(Hobsbami) 
Form of Mercantilism Industrial 'monopoly' Globalization 
capitalism and primitive capitalism capitalism (world 
accumulation capitalism) 
Symbolic events Columbus' The French World War I; The fall of the 
'discovery' of Revolution; Russia's Berlin Wall; 
the Americas England's 18th- Bolshevik and the 
century revolution in disintegration 
manufacturing Russia of the Soviet 
revolution Union 
Political Capitalists Rise of the Rise of End of the 
manifestations emerging from bourgeoisie and financial Bretton Woods 
'feudal the nation state industrial system; 
cocoon' corporations; collapse of 
imperialist socialism; 
wars; and a failure of 
socialist Third World 
alternative national 
liberation 
movements 
The use of the above three criteria leads to an identical conclusion with 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development 
Report (1999a, 30) which states: "globalization is not new: the world was 
more integrated a century ago; trade and investment as a proportion of GDP 
were comparable, and with borders open, many people were migrating 
abroad". So, what differentiates the current era of globalization from that 
of preceding periods? 
As suggested earlier, revolutionary new technologies and the rapidity 
of change caused by these technologies characterize the current round of 
globalization. Friedman sums up the distinctive features as 'three 
democratizations'- of technology, of finance, and of information (1999, 39-
58). Rothschild (1999, 107) thinks that "for both its admirers and its 
opponents, it [globalization] is associated with new and unprecedented 
technologies: the Internet, international capital markets, supersonic travel, 
cable news, and just-in-time deliveries across very large distances". Barber 
(1995, 4) argues that a new 'McWorld' will emerge that "demand(s) 
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integration and uniformity and that mesmerize(s) people everywhere with 
fast music, fast computers, and fast food- MTV, Macintosh, and 
McDonald's- pressing nations into one homogeneous global theme park, 
one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment, 
and commerce". As a UNDP publication states, what is really new about 
globalization is that it involves (1) new markets, (2) new actors, (3) new 
rules and norms, and (4) new (faster and cheaper) tools of communication 
(UNDP, 1999b). 
Dramatic increase in speed and significant cost reductions in the 
communications arena lay the foundation for ensuing globalization. For 
instance, a three-minute call from New York to London in 1960 cost the 
equivalent of $46 in 1990 dollars, but in 1990 the cost for the same call 
dropped to $3. If the average cost of computers in 1990 is given an index 
of 100, the index for 1960 would be 12,500. The dramatic decline of cost 
and the simultaneous increase of speed inspires Friedman (1999, 9) to draw 
a contrast: 
While the defining measurement of the Cold War was weight- particularly the throw 
weight of missiles- the defining measurement of the globalization system is speed-
speed of commerce, travel, communication and innovation. The Cold War was about 
Einstein's mass-energy equation, e =me!. Globalization is about Moore's law, which 
states that the computing power of silicon chips will double every eighteen to twenty-
four months. 
While these types of innovation benefit most developed nations, what 
impact could this have on the global South? Do they offer unprecedented 
opportunities or present insurmountable barriers to the less developed 
countries (LDCs) to tap into the current round of globalization? The 
answer to this question requires a reexamination of the world's economic 
structure (hierarchy and division of labor) in the context of the era's 
accelerated changes. If knowledge equates with power and its rapid 
dissemination promotes development, as the World Bank's World 
Development Report (1999) points out, then globalization- especially the 
computer and communication technology- reinforces and perhaps 
exacerbates the power differentials between the global North and South. 
Measuring international power in the era of globalization requires an 
examination oflnternet users rather than conventional military power, such 
as missiles. The Internet, which promotes international and domestic 
commerce and the dissemination of information epitomizes the .current 
globalization. Table 2.2 presents a breakdown of Internet users by region. 
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Table 2.2 Uneven Globalization- Internet Users by Region 
Region/Year 
Millions online• 
2000 
Percentage of world's users 
2000 1998 1997 
North America (USA & Canada) 
Europe 
Asia-Pacific 
South I Latin America 
Africa 
Middle East 
World Total 
177.8 
114.0 
104.9 
16.5 
3.1 
2.4 
418.6 
42.5 
27.2 
25.l 
3.9 
0.7 
0.6 
57.0 
21.8 
17.0 
3.0 
0.8 
0.5 
Note: •Estimated numbers as of December 2000, by Nua Internet Surveys. 
Source: Compiled and calculated from NUA Internet Surveys (200la; 1998; 1997). 
62.5 
19.7 
14.7 
2.0 
0.6 
0.5 
15 
Table 2.2 shows two important trends. First, it clearly affirms that 
America and globalization remain part and parcel, with Internet usage 
clustered strongly in that country. Among the estimated 418.6 million 
Internet users worldwide in 2000, 42.5 % of them lived in North America, 
mostly in the US and Canada. North America's dominance in the early 
years after the advent of the Worldwide Web was even higher- in 1997, 
five-eighthsof all the world's Internet users lived in this region. English is 
the apparent lingua franca of the cyberspace, as more than 80% of all the 
websites are written in English. The ability of the U.S. to create the 
institutions and rules- defining protocols, allocating domains, standardizing 
languages- for the cyberworld characterizes what political scientist Stephen 
Krasner calls 'meta-power', which perpetuates and strengthens overall 
American power at lower cost. 
Second, globalization progressed unevenly. Neither Africa nor the 
Middle East developed extensive Internet-based communications with the 
globalized world; their online populations remain negligible. One African 
official report described the huge gap in Internet connectivity between the 
global North and South by stating that "there are more phone lines in 
Manhattan than in all of sub-Sahara Africa" (Shapiro, 1999, 20). 
However, European and Asian countries, including those traditionally 
considered 'developing,' steadily increased their Internet exposure during 
the past five years. In fact, some of the fast-growing countries in the Asia-
Pacific region experienced explosive growth rates of their online 
populations. For example, in barely three years from 1997 to 2000, China's 
online population increased from 200,000 to 16.9 million (By contrast, the 
country's Internet 'penetration rate'- online population as a percentage of 
total population- rose from 0.001% to 1.34% during the same period). 
From June 1996 to July 2000, Taiwan's Internet penetration rate rose from 
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1.7% to 28.84% (NUA Internet Surveys, 200lb). 
The absorption of Internet technology in Asia illustrates an example of 
how countries utilize emerging technologies to partake in the globalization 
revolution. Asia continues to participate aggressively in the global 
economy and derive benefits from emerging technologies. Many analysts 
argued that globalization contributed to East Asia's dramatic post-World 
War II economic transformation, however, fewer scholars point out 
globalization' s detrimental impact on East Asia. Studying the changing 
economic and political fortune of East Asia sheds light on the debate over 
the merits and perils of globalization for underdeveloped countries. 
Asia's Ascendancy: Bringing the Global Factor back in 
The rapid ascendancy of several Asian economies after World War II 
attracted much interest from scholars and policymakers alike. First Japan, 
then the 'Little Dragons' or Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)- South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore- gained upward mobility in the 
international system by becoming important exporters of manufactured 
goods. Their ascent seemed to discredit the dependency theory in vogue 
during the 1970s (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Barrett and Chin, 1987; 
Evans, 1987), thereby enabling the liberals to tout the virtues for LDCs in 
maintaining outward-looking development strategies and access to global 
markets (World Bank, 1993). To varying degrees, Japanese and the NICs' 
strategies became replicated in several recently industrializing Southeast 
nations, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Macintyre 1994). The 
close economic relationships between the earlier industrializers and the 
later industrializers conjure up a 'flying geese' type of regional industrial 
development in East Asia (Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995). 
Indeed, until the outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis, East Asia 
commanded attention and emulation. But many economists and 
commentators now scorn the same 'star tigers' after a sudden reversal of 
economic fortune for countries in the region. This raises a disturbing 
intellectual question: How can some of the same factors caused the 
successes of these nations- outward orientation, strong state, and market-
coordinating intervention- also cause their economic demise? Do both 
earlier praise and present criticisms reflect premature judgements? 
A quick settlement to this controversy remains unlikely. However, so 
far, some explanations offer more promise than others because of their 
comprehensive nature. Theoretical frameworks rooted in an analysis of 
global capitalism and its linkage to domestic economies provides useful 
sources of potential explanations. For example, according to the world 
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system theory (Wallerstein, 1979), Asia joined the Western core-dominated 
capitalist system as part of the periphery. Consequently, Asia's rise and fall 
closely relate to globalization. Explanations for the Asian financial crisis 
that include both international and domestic-level factors are more 
intellectually satisfying than those that employ only domestic factors (e.g., 
'crony capitalism'). 
The rapid ascent of dynamic Asian economies attracted much 
attention. Some analysts have admiringly described these Asian 
economies' success in the last three decades as 'miracle'. Others firmly 
believe that an East Asian model of development holds rich potential for 
other developing countries. Moreover, scholars have also long debated over 
how to explain Asia's economic success and whether this success story can 
be replicated elsewhere. A full treatment of this debate is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. However, discussions about certain aspects of 
globalization- specifically the merits of participating in the international 
economy and the proper role of the state in economic development-
provide insight into Asia's economic development strategy. 
Table 2.3 summarizes two competing perspectives explanations regarding 
the East Asian miracle. 
While the dependency school depicts the forced participation in the 
world economy under an 'unjust' international division of labor as 
exploitation, both the neoclassical and the revisionist schools in Table 2.3 
emphasize the benefits LDCs derive through their participation in the 
international economy. However, neoclassicalists and revisionists differ on 
the method by which LDCs should participate in the international economy. 
The neoclassical axiom states that LDCs should organize their participation 
based on the principle of comparative advantage arising from natural factor 
endowment. In contrast, the revisionists argue that the state must 
deliberately but judiciously employ incentives to promote industrial 
development that is anchored on an outward-oriented strategy. 
Specifically, they note that the most successful Asian countries adopted an 
export-led industrialization (ELI) strategy. By contrast, their Latin 
American counterparts that adopted an import-substituting industrialization 
(ISi) strategy that led to fewer successes (Haggard, 1990; Gereffi and 
Wyman, 1990). 
Not only have the Asian economies been more integrated with the 
world economy than other regions, but their developments became more 
regionally integrated than Latin American counterparts. Some scholars 
(e.g., Cumings, 1987) suggest that a regional approach provides a more 
useful framework for understanding East Asia's patterns of development 
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Table 2.3 Explaining the East Asian Miracle: Two Different Accounts 
Main reason for 
success 
Market vs. state 
More concerned 
about 
View on external 
ties 
Roles of 
government: nature 
of policies 
Neoclassical View 
Getting the prices (basics) right 
State follows the market 
Government failures 
Positive: They help achieve efficiency 
and gains 
Investing in human capital 
Promoting private enterprises 
Maintaining an open economy 
Maintaining macroeconomic stability 
('fundamental' intervention policies) 
Revisionist View 
Getting the prices m-ong 
State leads the market 
Market failures 
Positive: But they should 
be regulated by the state 
Fundamental plus crafting 
and implementing 
selective intervention 
policies: Industrial and 
banking policies 
and integration than single country analysis. Specifically, the development 
of regional political economy in East Asia has followed a 'flying geese' 
model (Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995; Romm, 1992). According to this 
model, countries gradually move up in technological development by 
following the patterns of those that preceded them in the development 
process (Radelet and Sachs, 1997). In this vision, Korea and Taiwan took 
over leadership in textiles and apparel from Japan as the latter moved into 
the higher technology sectors of electronics, transport, and other capital 
goods. A decade or so later, Korea and Taiwan would upgrade to 
electronics and auto components, while the textile and apparel industries 
moved to Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and China. 
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs argue that, to a certain extent, the 
flying geese pattern reflects the natural outcome of market forces, 
indicating that global economic forces also shape the patterns of regional 
industrialization. However, they also admit "even the simplest labor-
intensive products (apparel, footwear, electronics assembly) are part of a 
sophisticated international division of labor, one increasingly determined 
by multinational enterprises and technological designs created in the 
advanced economies" (1997, 52). 
From this discussion, one can understand why the neo-Marxist 
dependency writers contend that Asia owes its 'success' to a temporary 
comparative advantage entirely based on the exploitation of cheap labor in 
such designated export platforms as 'free export processing zones' with few 
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linkages to the surrounding economy. This type of development, akin to 
what Peter Evans (1979) calls 'dependent development' in the Latin 
American context, resulted in deepening inequalities and marginalization. 
This neo-Marxist position becomes known as the new international division 
oflabor (NIDL) thesis (Hoogvelt, 1997, 204). 
Hoogvelt asks whether the developmental state phenomenon in East 
Asia reflects historically specific, rather than culturally specific (emphases 
original) factors: 
The historical specificity of the 'model' relates to the external environment of the geo-
politics of the Cold War and its unique conjunction with a certain phase in the 
development of capitalism on a world scale (1997, 213). 
Burbach and Robinson (1999) echo the NIDL view. They rebuke most 
of what they call 'detractors of globalization' that focus on global trade, 
and therefore the market. Instead, they argue, "The process of globalization 
is driven by the transnationalization of production and capital ownership, 
which in turns leads to the rise of a transnationalized bourgeoisie that sits at 
the apex of the global order" (1999, 7, 15). They conclude: "Global 
capitalism, therefore, is now represented in each nation-state by in-country 
representatives, who constitute transnationalized fractions of dominant 
groups" (1999, 34). These leftist scholars fill in a very important void in 
the mainstream rosy 'McWorld' interpretation of globalization. Clearly, it 
is important to consider the politics- class, democratic deficit, and civil 
society- of globalization, both at the domestic and international levels. 
Their influence led to calls for 'globalization with a human face' (UNDP, 
1999b). 
If politics is defined as a process of authoritatively allocating scarce 
resources, then political processes remain at the core of globalization, as it 
entails important distributional consequences that create a group of 
transnationalized bourgeoisie. In the neo-Marxist parlance, one can even 
argue that modern computer and communication technology constitutes a 
new means of production and creates new relations of production. It 
threatens to exacerbate existing class conflicts by increasing inequalities. 
Stephen Gill (1999) offers an insightful neo-Marxist interpretation of 
the Asian crisis. He argues that the Asian crisis is partly attributable to 
geopolitics, namely, 'the third phase of a longer process involving the 
reassertion of U.S. strategic dominance', which is reflected in the ideology 
of neoliberalism and the mechanism of the International Monetary Fund's 
(IMF) strict conditionality. Did Western dominance contribute to East 
Asia's economic troubles? 
With these caveats, we can proceed to discuss the relationship between 
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globalization and the Asian financial crisis and speculate on the future of the 
developmental state model in an era of globalizing economies within the 
context of embedded neoliberalism. 
The Globalization of Asia: Laying the Foundation for the Crisis? 
Just how globalized has East Asia become? Has East Asia become a victim 
of its own success? Employing some of the most commonly used 
indicators in the study of globalization (i.e., growth of trade volume, trade 
share of GDP, growth of external debt, and external debt share of GNP), 
Table 2.4 depicts globalization trends in Asian countries over the past two 
decades. To the extent such increased exposure to the world market offers 
them more opportunities, it also makes them more vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of the world economy. 
Table 2.4 compares these indicators for two periods, 1980 and 1996, 
the year before the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. The table reveals 
several important findings. First, all these countries had experienced a very 
large growth in merchandise trade (in current dollars) during the period 
under study. Trade indeed had served as one important- if not the- 'engine 
of growth'. Several Asian countries, particularly Japan and the NICs, have 
become important exporters of manufactured goods for the world markets. 
Second, leading up to the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Malaysia had become more and more dependent upon 
trade (i.e., foreign markets)- measured by the percentage share of trade 
volume of gross domestic product (GDP). But other countries, such as 
Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore experienced a decline in 
trade dependence, despite overall growth in absolute trade. This indicates 
the increased importance of their domestic markets. Hong Kong, 
historically an entrep6t, saw its trade share rise, mainly because of 
Mainland China's rapid economic development and expanding exports 
since 1980. 
Third, apparently, a correlation between external debt and economic 
vulnerability exists. Not coincidentally, all of those countries most 
negatively affected by the Asian financial crisis previously assumed large 
external debt burdens in the leading to the crisis. In particular, Thailand 
and Indonesia accumulated such massive foreign debt that their debts 
matched or even exceeded their respective annual GNPs. The bad 
experience of these Asian debtors shared many important similarities with 
the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. During that crisis, a 
combination of factors- rising interest rates in the international financial 
markets, declining earnings from exports from these debtor nations, and 
Globalization and the Developmental State 21 
pressure on these nations to devaluate their currencies- rapidly raised these 
nations' debt service ratios (export earnings/GNP) to unbearable levels, 
threatening a default. Only IMF's intervention averted the crisis (Frieden, 
1991). 
Table 2.4 Rising Asian Trade Dependence and External Debt 
Trade volume• Trade share of External debt External debt 
($billions) GDP(%) ($ billions) as %ofGNP 
1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996 1997 
Thailand 15.8 129.1 54 83 8.3 90.8 61 
Indonesia 32.7 92.6 54 51 20.9 129.0 62 
Philippines 14.0 55.0 52 94 17.4 41.2 51 
Malaysia 23.7 154.2 113 183 6.6 39.8 48 
South Korea 39.7 269.1 74 69 33 
Taiwan 39.5 218.3 95 80 
Singapore 43.4 255.9 440 356 
Hong Kong 41.7 379.3 181 285 
Note: •Merchandise exports plus merchandise imports. 
Sources: Compiled and calculated from World Bank (1999, 228-31; 2000, 268-71) and 
CEPD (1998, 204, 213). 
Data show that Asian countries experienced increased globalization, in 
terms of trade and debt (both their blessing and curse), but the extent of 
each economy's globalization varies widely from country to country. Table 
2.5 attempts to measure globalization by three indicators- Internet users 
(absolute numbers, shares of total population, and per 1,000 people), 
Internet hosts per 10,000 people, and personal computers per 1,000 people. 
The last three columns take into account population size by providing 
'standardized' measures on the 'density' of personal computers and Internet 
users. The picture it presents- the disparate 'information power' in Asia-
provides a new way to conceptualize power and plenty in the information 
age. 
Table 2.5 emphasizes the central role that the modern information and 
communication technology plays in our current phase of globalization. 
Most of the proponents of globalization, considered 'technophiles' (Luke, 
1989), view communication technology as a hallmark of globalization. In 
this paradigm, a country's 'information power', determines a country's 
overall strength, rather than traditional militaristic measurements. 
In fact, some scholars speculate that as globalization progresses, the 
state, if it continues to exist, will become a 'virtual state' that thrives on 
ultra-mobile factors of production such as knowledge or human capital. 
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International relations, consisting of these virtual states, will be inherently 
peaceful (Rosecrance, 1996). If accurate, the prospects for prosperity or 
peace within regions and specific countries vary depending on the extent of 
information globalization. 
As computer prices and Internet access fees continue to decline rapidly, 
increasingly more people will access a virtual world. The advent of the 
Worldwide Web in the mid-1990s was unquestionably a powerful boost to 
expanding the global Internet population. Table 2.5, which takes into 
account population size, compares the 'information density' of select 
countries. 
Small nations with excellent communication infrastructure and 
extensive external economic ties fare exceptionally well under this new 
notion of national power. Singapore, Netherlands, and Finland rank as 
among the most globally integrated countries on Foreign Policy's (2001) 
,index. Finland, with a population of just over 5 million and home of Nokia, 
is one of the 'most wired' nations. Meanwhile, the U.S. ranks as the 
country with the most Internet users in absolute numbers (estimated at 
164.4 million, or close to 60% of the population- 4.25 times more than that 
of the next, Japan). In fact, fifteen countries account for 90% of all Internet 
users. 
It should also be affirmed that those NICs that actively promoted the 
information technology {IT) industry, such as Taiwan and South Korea, 
fare quite well in terms of 'information power'. For example, Taiwan 
decided in the early 1980s to promote the IT industry as a strategic industry 
in anticipation of these broad trends in technology and trade (Wang, 
1995/96; Lin, 1998). On a per capita basis, Taiwan's computer density is 
higher than Japan's and the NICs' Internet penetration rates (as a share of 
population) remain comparable to Japan's. However, in the long run, 
China seems to have limitless potential with estimates up to 37 million 
users by 2005 (NUA Internet Surveys, 200lb; 1999a; 1999b). 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that all the East Asian countries became much 
more globalized in recent years but simultaneously demonstrated variations 
in their dependence on trade, external debt, and foreign investment. 
Furthermore, variations exist in terms of their information power. In other 
words, each country accumulated a different mix of 'assets' and 'liabilities' 
associated with globalization, with each precise mix entailing important 
consequences. Table 2.5 also provides an unusual perspective for 
understanding the Asian financial crisis. Not coincidentally those countries 
that score low on 'information power' - for example, Indonesia and 
Thailand- received, prima facie, the most abrupt dislocations associated 
with the Asian financial crisis (see Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.5 Uneven Globalization- Disparate Information Power 
Internet Internet Internet Internet Personal 
users• users 0/o• usersb hosts• computers• 
Thailand 1.0 1.65 16.2 .646 21.6 
Indonesia 0.4 0.18 1.9 .1 8.2 
Philippines 0.5 0.62 6.5 .158 15.1 
Malaysia 1.5 6.88 66.1 2.543 58.6 
South Korea 16.4 34.55 350.4 6.003 156.8 
Taiwan 6.4 28.84 290.9 130.444 336.0 
Singapore 1.9 44.58 578.1 4.522 458.4 
Hong Kong 1.9 26.00 268.l 1.628 254.2 
China 16.9 1.34 13.5 0.057 8.9 
India 4.5 0.45 4.5 0.023 2.7 
Japan 38.6 30.53 305.2 2.081 237.2 
USA 164.4 59.86 602.4 193.997 458.6 
Finland 2.8 43.93 436.5 121.842 349.2 
Notes and Sources: 
"Data for 2000; 'Internet users' in millions and percent as percent of total population. The 
months in which surveys were done varied. NUA Internet Surveys (200lb, 200lc, 200ld). 
binternetusers I population as of 1999; expressed in l,OOOs. NUA Internet Surveys (2001b, 
2001c, 200ld) and World Bank (2000, 278-9). 
c World Bank (2000, 310-1) employs data from International Telecommunication Union. 
All country data for 2000, except Taiwan. Taiwan's internet host data are internet 
subscribers per 10,000 people for 1999. Taiwan's computers per 1,000 people data are 1995 
estimate, using the following formula: [(Units of desktop PCs produced in 1995) +(units of 
notebook PCs produced in 1995)] I (1995 total population). Compare figures in this column 
with caution. Admittedly many of these Truwanese computers were exported. However, the 
World Bank/ITU data on other countries do not affirm they are for domestic use, not export. 
All data in l,OOOs. See CEPD (2000, 20 and 142) and Figure 5.3 from World Technology 
Evaluation Center (1999). 
This correlation seems to confirm the finding by Amartya Sen, the 
1998 Nobel economics laureate, that accurate information flows are 
necessary to prevent man-made policy disasters (e.g., famine). If the 
financial crisis can be viewed as a 'man-made' crisis in the sense of policy 
failures, patron-client politics, and lack of accountability, then to what 
extent can the lack of transparency explain the downfall of such Asian 
countries as Indonesia and Thailand? And to what extent can weaknesses 
in 'information power' explain the negative impact of the Asian Crisis 
among countries? From this standpoint we can understand why developing 
the information technology (IT) industry is so important for Asian 
countries, because it not only produces new sources of growth, but also lays 
foundation for a more open and resilient society. 
The Asian financial crisis dealt a devastating blow to several Asian 
high-fliers. Table 2.6 shows the effects by tracking several indicators from 
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1997, when the crisis started, in 1998, when the crisis reached maturity, and 
then again in 1999, when several countries began to slowly recover. All 
five of these affected countries experienced large currency devaluations, 
recession, and shrinking wealth. Furthermore, just as these Asian countries 
began to improve, the economic slowdown in the U.S. and the decline in 
technology related share prices on the US stock exchange 2000, severely 
dampened the momentum of East Asia's economic revival. Those 
countries that 'weathered' the 1997-9 crisis, such as Taiwan, now show 
surprisingly unusual economic difficulties in 2000 and 2001. 
These aggregate statistics fail to accurately depict the human suffering, 
especially among the poor, resulting from the crisis. As a condition for 
accepting the IMF's conditionality, these countries slashed social spending 
(on education, health, and unemployment assistance) while the number of 
jobs decline precipitously. Frightened foreign investors fled rapidly and 
mercilessly- to use Friedman's (1999) 'electronic herd' metaphor. 
Domestic entrepreneurs saw their confidence shaken and encountered 
problems in raising new capital for investment. The newly emergent 
middle class (the segment widely viewed as the catalyst for bringing about 
a democratic polity) and non-agricultural labor force saw their savings and 
net value plummet as poverty also increased. The social and economic 
stress caused by the financial crisis portended political crises. 
An estimated 40 million people lived on less than one U.S. dollar per 
day in the five affected countries before the crisis, primarily in Indonesia 
and the Philippines. The first year of the crisis witnessed those living in 
absolute poverty more than double in countries without elaborate social 
safety nets, with pockets of absolute poverty reappearing in South Korea 
and Thailand (Jackson, 1999a, 2). 
Despite these problems, prior to the outbreak of the 1997 crisis, the 
Asian economies were praised as among the most successful LDCs. Their 
predominant development strategy- ELI with a focus on manufactured 
goods, promoted by a strong, autonomous and developmentally oriented 
state- nearly achieved the status of the new development orthodoxy. 
Both the material fortune of these countries and the intellectual 
popularity of the model vanished quickly with the 'sudden', 'surprising', 
and dramatic collapse of their financial and property markets. As a sign 
that theorizing in international and comparative studies often gets unduly 
dictated by daily events and caught up in the fads of the moment, many 
unsophisticated accounts began to blame these countries' misery on, more 
or less, the identical factors that had contributed to these countries' earlier 
success. Was the developmental state model intellectually hypocritical to 
begin with? Did the model outlive its usefulness as national economies 
became increasingly enmeshed with one another through the activities of 
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the global market? Answers to these key questions require an exploration 
into the causes of the Asian financial crisis. 
Table 2.6 Asian Crisis: Shrinking Currency and Vanishing Wealth 
Country Thailand Indonesia Philippines Malaysia S. Korea 
Exchange rate to baht rupiah peso ringgit won 
US dollar 
Jun 1997 24.5 2,380 26.3 2.5 850 
Jul 1998 41.0 14,150 42.0 4.1 1,290 
Aug 1999" 37.3 6,915 38.8 3.8 1,199 
Sep2000" 42.6 8,740 45.9 3.8 1,126 
GNP (US billions dollars)b 
Jun 1997 170 205 75 90 430 
Jul 1998 102 34 47 55 283 
Aug 1999 103 71 51 59 318 
Sep2000 122 129 79 75 404 
Growth rate(%) 
Jul 1998-Aug 1999 -8.0 1.8 1.2 -1.3 4.6 
Sep 1999-Sep 2000 5.2 4.1 4.5 5.2 9.6 
Notes: "Exchange rates obtained on 4 August, 1999 and 20 September, 2000 from Yahoo! 
Currency Converter (http://www.yahoo.com). 
h All current dollars. 
Source: Jackson (1999a, 2);Asiaweek (1999; 2000). 
The Developmental State as Cause of the Asian Crisis? 
Although no consensus exists regarding the precise cause of the Asian 
Crisis, general agreements exist. Although the precise causes in each 
country were slightly different, most analysts generally agree that the 
causes of the crisis included both external forces and internal weaknesses: 
(1) financial-sector weaknesses (corruption and nepotism, lack of credit-
worthy criteria for lending, 'moral hazards', excessive speculative 
investments in real estate), (2) external-sector problems (overvalued 
currencies due to 'pegging', speculative buying and selling by international 
financiers, excessive borrowing abroad, and a substantial portion of short-
term debt) and (3) the 'contagion effect' (Haggard, 2000; Pempel, 1999; 
Jackson, 1999b; and Goldstein, 1998). 
Intellectual honesty requires that advocates of neoliberalism share some 
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responsibility for the Asian financial crisis. The crisis qualifies as a case of 
unintended consequences of premature liberalization that 'back-fired'. 
Over the years, Western countries pressured Asian economies to globalize 
long before they possessed the technical expertise and political will to 
establish the requisite financial institutions to properly manage large 
amounts of capital in and out of their countries. Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahatir's war of words with George Soros, the international financier, 
captures Asians' frustration and resentment toward the devastation caused 
by 'rational' currency traders: "All these countries have spent forty years to 
build up their economies and a moron like Soros comes along" (Loh, 1997). 
At a deeper structural level, since most of these Asian countries 
embrace capitalism, can their collapse be attributed to some structural flaws 
within capitalism? Here Stephen Gill's differentiation between two 
different varieties of capitalism provides valuable clues (Gill 1998, 4-5). In 
the Anglo-American capital-market system (or 'fluid' capital system), the 
stock and bond markets provide a supply of capital to firms. The providers 
of capital, mainly shareholders and investors, expect a high level of 
accountability and adherence to profit projections. In return, corporate 
failure results in declining share value and bond ratings, the removal of the 
top executives of the firm, or in worse case scenario bankruptcy with all 
workers dismissed and assets liquidated. 
In contrast, Gill describes the Japanese and East Asian financial 
systems as 'credit-based' or dedicated capital systems. Historically these 
tended to be bank-centered, highly concentrated, and state-directed 
systems. In a crisis, the government generally negotiates adjustments 
among affected groups ('stakeholders') within the society, including 
workers. In other words, the government, through informal workouts, 
works to socialize risk rather than privatize it. Based on this distinction, he 
criticizes the IMF bailout packages as 'socialization of private debts' and 
questions the class bias of the whole process. 
The IMF assured foreign investors and banks that their debt would be repaid, and it 
moved to roll over short-term into long-term debt, compelling various governments in 
effect to socialize private debts... [Tiris] shows the limit of the commitment of pure 
free-market policies when the interests of Western capital are endangered (Gill, 1999, 
6). 
In other words, the West preaches the philosophy of free market 
capitalism, but when its own capital becomes jeopardized, the West 
practices socialization of private debts. 
The financial crisis also contributed to full-fledged political crises or 
uncertain political transitions in several Asian countries. Authoritarian 
governments previously dominated many of these countries and they relied 
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heavily on economic development for legitimacy. Consequently, economic 
crisis served to undermine the very political foundation of authoritarian 
governments. Not surprisingly, the economic crisis prompted severe 
regime instability and a change of political leadership in Indonesia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea. (Suharto's downfall in 
Indonesia and his succession by three weak transitional figures, Habibie, 
Wahid, and Megawati, became sin qua non examples of evaporating 
legitimacy.) Only Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who managed to 
hang on by turning against his reformist deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, increasing 
repression, rejecting IMF package, and limiting capital movement managed 
to remain in power. Whether his approach will ultimately be vindicated 
remains to be seen. 
Without question, the Asian financial crisis dealt those affected serious 
political, economic, and social setbacks. At the same time, however, it also 
ushered in a promising new era of democratization. But do these harbinger 
the death of the developmental state? Does the prevalence of IMF bailout 
signify- to use Fukuyama's (1989) phrases- the 'unabashed triumph' of, 
and the 'exhaustion of viable alternatives' to, neoliberalism? Can that be 
interpreted as underscoring America's unparalleled power? Furthermore, 
was the Asian economic miracle merely an ephemeral fluke? Lastly, what 
kind of government (or governance) do Asian countries need in order to 
cope with the internal and external challenges posed by a new century 
characterized by globalization? 
ConcJuding Remarks: Whither (or Wither?) the Developmental State? 
Discussion of the future fate- of the often venerated and sometimes vilified 
developmental state in the new era of new globalization- requires a review 
of the logic and condition under which it excels should provide some 
answers. Table 2.7 compares the essential features of the developmental 
state (the Asian model) with the regulatory state (the Anglo-American 
model). 
To summarize, the developmental state paradigm consists of three 
elements (or rather, observations or reification). First, the East Asian states 
place top priority on economic development, often operationalized in terms 
of growth, productivity, and competitiveness. Second, in order to achieve 
these broadly defined goals, the state actively intervenes in the market to 
guide, discipline, and coordinate the private sector through the strategic 
allocation of resources and the use of diverse policy instruments. 
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Table 2.7 Developmental State vs. Regulatory State 
Characteristics 
Basis ofRationality 
Focus 
Main Goal 
Criterion of Success 
Explicit Industrial Policy 
Focal or Pilot Agency 
Prerequisite for Success 
Better at Coping With 
Locus of Decision Making 
Main Actors 
Examples 
Regulatory State 
Market-Rational 
Rules 
Regulation 
Efficiency 
No 
No 
No 
Shocks 
Parliament 
Economists and Lawyers 
US and UK 
Developmental State 
Plan-Rational 
Outcome 
Development 
Effectiveness 
Yes 
Yes 
National Consensus 
Routines 
(Elite) Bureaucracy 
Bureaucrats and Nationalists 
Japan, S. Korea, and Taiwan 
Third, competent bureaucrats, who insulate themselves from political 
and social pressures, increase the success of strategic state intervention in 
Asian economies. These insulated, interventionist states, contrary to 
neoclassical projections, have been relatively free from rent-seeking or 
predation (Moon and Prasad, 1998). 
At the heart of the debate over the developmental vs. regulatory state is 
the central issue- and perennial scholarly controversy- of the relative 
importance of the state and the market in economic development 
(Putterman and Rueschemeyer, 1992). Today virtually no serious scholar 
completely dismisses any role for the state. Nor can corporations replace 
states for governing. Even the World Bank, the institutional embodiment 
of neoliberal ideology, recognized the importance of sound policy and good 
governance (World Bank, 1997, 1993). 
Both the state and the market are key agents of economic development. 
Earlier theorizing on East Asia depicted an adversarial relationship between 
the two, but the precise formula, to a considerable extent, still depends on 
vogue. Current scholarship aspires to move beyond either state or market 
and toward a third-generation theory (Chan, Clark, and Lam, 1998; Rowen, 
1998). 
A brief recap serves to trace the evolution of scholarship (or vogue) in 
the field. The first-generation theory, espoused by neoclassical economists 
and the World Bank in the 1970s and early 1980s, attributes East Asia's 
dynamic development and economic success to the 'magic of the market' -
laissezfaire and open economy (Balassa, 1981). State intervention, if any, 
forces market conformity by aiming only to 'get the fundamentals right' 
(World Bank, 1993). 
In contrast, the second-generation theory, emerging in the late 1980s 
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and early 1990s and advocated mainly by political scientists, argues that the 
key to East Asia's success is the 'developmental state', an autonomous and 
strong political entity with a coherent corporate goal- development. State 
intervention in 'late industrializers' (LDCs) is pervasive, seeking to 
deliberately 'set the prices wrong' in order to create competitive advantage 
for the developing country (Amsden, 1989). 
The popularity of the statist theory lasted until the outbreak of the 
Asian financial crisis. The once venerated East Asian model became 
discredited and scorned. While earlier admirers championed the East Asian 
developmental state as a model for other LDCs to emulate, today's critics 
disparage 'moral hazard' and other undesirable collusive practices, 
especially financial sector weakness (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). 
The swift shift in explanations leaves much to be desired. In reality, 
the developmental state probably never exercised omnipotent presence as 
many enthusiasts believed. At the same time, it certainly cannot be as 
guilty as detractors portray. For the foreseeable future, the Asian states are 
likely to maintain their exposure to the world markets, rather than turning 
inward. Globalization undeniably will pose special challenges to the 
developmental state. But the proper response for the Asian states is to 
reform, rather than jettison, their developmental state. Reasons for 
necessary reform abound. 
First, the political milieu of most Asian countries today reflects quite 
different concerns and realities from that during the take-off phase. Most 
Asian developmental states made their transitions to democracy in the 
1980s-90s and some are well under way toward consolidating their new 
democracies. In the aftermath of decades of suppression, civil society 
begins to reassert itself as distributional coalitions form and postmodern 
values (Inglehart, 1997) gradually take hold. These trends mean that an 
increasingly large portion of the population seek to benefit from economic 
development and will use the political process to obtain them. For 
example, more than three decades of pursuing single-minded growth, 
environmental degradation constituted a costly and irreversible price. 
Facing these new expectations and priorities, the developmental state will 
have to promote a form of development that is true to the meaning- that is, 
balancing growth and sustainability, quantitative expansion and qualitative 
improvement, production and consumption (welfare), and foreign markets 
and the domestic market. In other words, development in a democracy 
should aim at improving security and the physical quality of life, rather 
than a singular focus on quantitative macroeconomic expansion. 
Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, two long-time critics of the 
East Asian developmental state, prophetically proclaimed almost one 
decade ago, ''The old strategy of high-speed, export-oriented growth will 
30 Transfonning East Asian Domestic and International Politics 
not get the NICs through the 1990s" (1992, 337). They called for a 
comprehensive and coherent vision of an alternative mode of development. 
They then went on to portray the contours of this new comprehensive 
alternative paradigm: democratic participation, the growth and 
consolidation of the domestic market, equity, sustainable development, a 
selective export policy, and the development of equitable regional 
associations (1992, 338-41). With corporations and NGOs underming the 
authority of the state, it is increasingly doubtful whether a globalized world 
economy can afford a developmental state par excellence that pursues 
national interests in terms of maximizing its relative gains through the 
practice of neomercantilism. 
Secondly, the operating principles of globalized economy juxtaposed 
against a developmental state consisting of competent technocrats insulated 
by authoritarian politicians without accountability to the public has become 
a practical impossibility and an anachronism in a world where information 
flows more freely. Increasingly, the need for political accountability 
reflects a popular theme among those calling for reforms in governance, 
whether on domestic or international level. Thus far, despite its evident 
benefits to a large number of people and states, globalization suffers from a 
paucity of democratic accountability. At the global level, many critics view 
the institutions and procedures as undemocratic and non-transparent and its 
impacts uneven or unjust. Tactics notwithstanding, the protesters at the 
World Trade Organization's Seattle meeting in 2000 and the Group of 
Eight summit meeting in 2001 legitimately demanded corrections to 
globalization' s democratic deficits. Under this global context, a 
developmental state seeking to operate in secret and withhold information 
from its citizens cannot succeed in increasing its legitimacy. A fiasco like 
the Asian financial crisis actually provides a welcome wake-up call in the 
still unfolding historical process of globalization. We can learn from the 
crisis the importance of good governance. 
Because of its emphasis on technology, globalization entails some 
potential (not guaranteed) to level the playing field between decision-
makers and those that are affected by the decisions. For example, the 
computer and communication technology may enable the advent of 
'electronic democracy'. It can empower the citizenry by making it easier 
and more meaningful for ordinary citizens to participate in politics and 
express their views. By facilitating more participation in our unfortunate 
but necessary republican form of government, it may enable efforts toward 
good governance without too much government dictate. It also contributes 
to the emergence of a vibrant civil society. Many writers (e.g., Barber, 
1995) have always considered the civil society as the necessary (but 
missing) link and buffer between the state and the individual. In the global 
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age, the civil society takes on new importance as the 'human face' between 
anonymous global forces and real individuals. 
The third reason the developmental state needs reform rests in the 
realities of the internal dislocations caused globalization (i.e., to protect its 
citizens from the excesses of globalization). While globalization may bring 
material and political benefits directly to citizens by bypassing states that 
consistently censor information, it must also protect citizens from economic 
difficulties and the erosion of cultural values. For example, in China where 
the regime still strictly controls information and the media still primarily 
serves as a tool for government propaganda, the Internet allows more and 
more people to receive alternative information, allowing them to formulate 
political opinions outside those supported by the government. At the same 
time, does the global community have China's best interest at heart in terms 
of economic and social development? These are difficult questions that the 
Chinese state must address as it reforms its political system. 
At the same time, globalization can also expose people more directly to 
both the beneficial and harmful forces beyond the control of the state. 
Whereas in the past all politics may well have been local, as the former 
Speakerofthe House Tip O'Neil once said, in the globalized world in which 
we live today, arguably all politics are global. In this regard, the developmental 
state should not 'wither away', by abdicating its responsibility to the global 
market forces that are best at producing efficiency and profits. It is 
unrealistic to expect corporations to provide global public goods, such as 
democracy, cooperation, and solidarity. If these public goods are provided 
at all by global market forces, they are afterthoughts or unintended 
consequences. Such values are too importapt to be relegated totally to an 
invisible hand. 
For the foreseeable future, good alternatives to the state, albeit an 
imperfect institution, will still be hard to find. Optimists who pin their 
hopes on 'corporate-like states' replacing states are remiss. The state exists 
to advance the interests of a group of people with a clear sense of destiny 
that resides on a geographically defined territory. The capacity for the state 
to take care of people during hard times is particularly important, as the 
Asian financial crisis sorely demonstrates. The true test of the state 
therefore lies in its ability to protect its citizens from the harms of 
globalization and to enable them to benefit from the advantages of 
globalization. 
Unless and until the state-centered Westphalian system is 
fundamentally overhauled, the developmental state will likely retain its 
raison d'etre, but it will have to become a 'kinder and gentler' (perhaps 
even slower) entity. Since extrication from the global economy is not a 
viable option for the Asian states, the developmental state must retool itself 
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so as to cope with this still-unfolding process, known as globalization. 
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